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ABSTRACT—Since the Supreme Court decision Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, courts have wrestled with what it 
means to be an arranger under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). One aspect of 
arranger liability that has undergone radical change in the past decade is the 
useful product doctrine, which allows a party to escape arranger liability by 
proving it was selling a useful product rather than arranging for disposal.  
Prior to Burlington Northern, courts applied the useful product 
doctrine restrictively, only allowing parties selling virgin products to 
escape liability and imposing liability on parties selling useful secondary 
products. Following Burlington Northern, this shifted, with courts requiring 
concrete evidence of intent in arrangements for disposal and allowing 
parties selling secondary products to escape liability even when their 
actions directly contributed to environmental contamination.  
This Note argues that this shift in the useful product doctrine will 
negatively impact the Superfund litigation landscape, and more 
importantly, the environment. This Note also posits that the shift in the 
useful product doctrine can be correlated to a shift in administrative law, 
away from deferring to agency decisions and towards a more searching 
judicial inquiry. This Note argues that the courts should scale back their 
permissive approach to the useful product doctrine and give greater weight 
to agency expertise and agency liability determinations when ruling on 
arranger liability cases in the useful product arena. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When carbonless copy paper was introduced in 1953 by chemists at 
the National Cash Register Corporation (NCR), it revolutionized the world 
of paper forms by reducing waste.1 Nonetheless, NCR simultaneously made 
the fateful decision to sell scraps from the carbonless paper, known as 
“broke,” to paper companies that used it as recyclable fiber.2 These paper 
companies, located on the Fox River in central Wisconsin, in turn 
discharged into the river as a part of their production process.3 
Despite being quickly eclipsed by copy machines, carbonless paper 
has maintained a legacy, albeit not a happy one. Until about 1971, high 
levels of cancer-causing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were dumped 
into the Fox River by the paper companies that purchased NCR’s broke.4 A 
lengthy, billion-dollar cleanup effort followed and, predictably, lawsuits 
1 See The Who, What When Where & Why of NCR Forms - No Carbon Required, MARSID M&M
GROUP, http://www.mmprint.com/NCRForm-Printing-History.cfm [https://perma.cc/NLA3-Q6XZ]; 
Appvion Marks 60 Years of Making Carbonless Paper, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/appvion-marks-60-years-of-making-carbonless-paper-
251943771.html [https://perma.cc/RA88-9FK7]. 
2 Appleton Papers, Inc., v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 776 F. Supp. 2d 857, 861 (E.D. Wis. 
2011). 
3 Id.; Lower Fox River and Green Bay Site, EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/region5/cleanup/foxriver/ 
[https://perma.cc/WAS9-QJJS] (last updated Nov. 14, 2016). 
4 Appleton, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 861; Lower Fox River, supra note 3. 
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ensued.5 These lawsuits required judges to consider whether and to what 
extent a company like NCR should be held responsible for its role in 
environmental contamination—a form of legal responsibility known as 
arranger liability. 
Arranger liability lies within the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or “Superfund”), 
the federal statute designed to clean up sites contaminated with hazardous 
substances.6 In addition to liability for arranging for disposal of a hazardous 
substance, a potentially responsible party (PRP) can also be found liable if 
it is a current owner or operator of the facility, was the owner or operator at 
the time of disposal, or if it transported waste to a facility.7 
Courts have wrestled with arranger liability8 since the Supreme 
Court’s seminal 2009 decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Co. v. United States9 dramatically changed the standard for this type of 
CERCLA liability.10 Judicial decisions before Burlington Northern favored 
a broad interpretation of the arranger provision, subjecting those who 
arrange for hazardous waste disposal to a strict liability standard.11 The 
5 Lower Fox River, supra note 3; Paul Srubas, Fox River PCB Liability Reshuffled in Judge’s 
Ruling, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE (May 20, 2015, 8:06 AM), http://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/
story/news/local/2015/05/19/ncrs-liability-fox-river-pcb-cleanup-reduced-judges-ruling/27613087/ 
[https://perma.cc/6G82-HEZE]. 
6 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2012). 
7 Id. § 9607(a). 
8 Arranger liability, sometimes referred to as generator liability, is a rather nebulous concept. The 
statute says that an arranger is 
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or 
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances 
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration 
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous 
substances . . . . 
Id. If a party produces a hazardous substance and then contracts for disposal off-site, that qualifies as 
arranging for disposal. See Anna Marple DuBoise, Expanding the Scope of Arranger Liability Under 
CERCLA, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 469, 472–73 (1995). However, as will be discussed, the sale of a useful 
product that happens to contain a hazardous component would not qualify as arrangement for disposal. 
See id. It is the many scenarios that fall between these two poles of arranger liability that makes the 
concept so complex. See id. 
9 556 U.S. 599 (2009). 
10 Katrina J. Brown, Comment, Contaminating the Superfund: Arranger Liability and the Evolution 
of CERCLA’s Not-So-Strict Liability, 11 WYO. L. REV. 485, 507–08 (2011). 
11 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled on other 
grounds by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Dorothy B. Godwin Living Tr., 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994) (“CERCLA liability has been 
described as ‘a black hole that indiscriminately devours all who come near it.’” (quoting Jerry L. 
Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1993))); United States v. Monsanto 
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standard to qualify as an arranger was quite low and could be established 
through either direct or circumstantial evidence that indicated that the 
arranger knew12 or should have known of the ultimate disposal.13 
Burlington Northern fundamentally altered the liability analysis for 
arrangers by requiring that a party possess actual intent to dispose, rather 
than mere knowledge of disposal.14 Since Burlington Northern, the doctrine 
has continued to shift, moving towards a world of lessened liability for 
arrangers who can make a colorable argument that they were selling a 
useful product.  
This Note falls within a broader framework of scholarship that 
addresses arranger liability, but it is the first to address the implications of a 
recent doctrinal shift in one specific area in which arranger liability has 
continued to change following Burlington Northern: the useful product 
doctrine. According to this doctrine, a PRP that sells hazardous material 
can escape arranger liability if it can prove that it was selling a useful 
product rather than arranging for disposal.15 Since Burlington Northern 
narrowed the definition of arranger, courts across the country have become 
increasingly permissive in allowing PRPs to raise the useful product 
doctrine defense and escape arranger liability.16 This represents a departure 
from earlier useful product cases, where parties were held to a higher 
standard and rarely skirted arranger liability.17 This shift can be exemplified 
Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) (“We agree with the overwhelming body of precedent that has 
interpreted section 107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme.”). 
12 United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996). 
13 See Jayna M. Cacioppo, Burlington Northern Limits on “Arranger” Liability Bleed into 
California Statutory Law, TAFT (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.taftlaw.com/news/publications/detail/
1229-i-burlington-northern-i-limits-on-arranger-liability-bleed-into-california-statutory-law 
[https://perma.cc/TM4U-4KPE]. 
14 556 U.S. at 612. 
15 Marc P. Lawrence, To Arrange or Not to Arrange: Intent Is the Question, MICH. B.J., Oct. 2009, 
at 48, 50. A clear example of a successful use of the useful product doctrine would be the sale of a new 
but hazardous material that later contaminated the environment. This could occur with chemicals or 
new products with a hazardous component such as mercury thermometers or automotive batteries. 
Contrast these types of sales with a scenario in which the conveyance of a useful product may be 
unclear, such as a situation in which a party sells a used product to another party for salvage or 
reprocessing. See Brief Amicus Curiae of International Association of Defense Counsel in Support of 
Petitioner Shell Oil Company at 17 n.11, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 
599 (2009) (No. 07-1601).  
16 See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 153–55 (4th Cir. 2015); NCR 
Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 705–07 (7th Cir. 2014); Team Enters., LLC v. W. 
Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901, 907–09 (9th Cir. 2011). 
17 See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 683–84 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Jones-
Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc. 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380–82 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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in part by the types of materials that recent courts have found to be useful 
products. Before Burlington Northern, courts found the sales of styrene for 
reprocessing18 and lead slag for lead reclamation19 to be arrangements for 
disposal, while after Burlington Northern, courts found the sales of used 
transformers,20 buildings contaminated with carcinogens,21 and scraps of 
carbonless copy paper22 to be sales of useful products. 
The recent changes in the application of the useful product doctrine 
are indicative of a fundamental shift that has occurred in favor of 
defendants. Historically, CERCLA’s joint and several liability scheme, 
coupled with low thresholds for finding liability across the four broad 
classes of PRPs, have led to the popular belief that CERCLA is a pro-
plaintiff statute that penalizes anyone caught in its net.23 Parties who suffer 
the misfortune of getting caught in the net must then pursue an equitable 
outcome in later actions for contribution or apportionment of harm.24 
However, the recent changes in the useful product cases indicate that, in 
this area, courts are limiting how widely the net can be cast. In particular, 
courts are considering a broad range of circumstantial evidence and moving 
away from the traditional strict liability approach that was used in the cases 
preceding Burlington Northern.25 
Going beyond Burlington Northern, courts are requiring the plaintiffs 
to do more to prove that an arranger intended to dispose of waste, as 
opposed to sell a useful product. While CERCLA places the burden on the 
defendant PRP to raise the useful product defense,26 in practice, courts 
insist that the plaintiff conclusively prove that the material disposed of was 
not a useful product.27 In this way, courts are transforming CERCLA from 
a “liability at any cost” statute to a scheme under which arranging entities 
18 Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 566. 
19 Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir. 2007). 
20 Consolidation Coal, 781 F.3d at 153–54. 
21 United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 350–51 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding that the contaminated 
buildings could be considered useful). 
22 NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 707 (7th Cir. 2014). 
23 See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA’s Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1446 (1997) 
(“Criticisms of CERCLA as substantively inequitable, harsh, or unfair fill the reported cases.”). 
24 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f)(1) (2012).  
25 See Consolidation Coal, 781 F.3d at 153–54; NCR Corp., 768 F.3d at 705–07; United States v. 
General Electric Co., 670 F.3d 377, 385–86 (1st Cir. 2012); Team Enterprises, LLC v. Western 
Investment Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2011), for case examples of courts’ use of 
a more holistic approach to the useful product doctrine. 
26 Courts characterize the useful product doctrine as a defense, implying that the defendant bears 
the burden of both asserting and proving the useful product doctrine to escape arranger liability. See, 
e.g., Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431, 436 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
27 See infra Part II.
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need little more than a plausible story of their intent in order to escape 
liability. By using circumstantial evidence to move away from strict 
liability, courts are subverting the statute and bringing it back to its 
common law roots, where stringent causation requirements allow 
defendants to get off scot-free. 
The consequences of this shift may be more far-reaching than most 
observers have previously recognized. While the burden of proving the 
useful product defense officially rests with the defendant PRP, the 
increased costs and risks of litigation introduced by the changes in case law 
may discourage the EPA from pursuing cases under this doctrine. This 
could lead to a decline in Superfund litigation and ultimately impact the 
pace of cleanup efforts across the country, threatening both human and 
environmental health. 
There is some evidence that this change in judicial application of the 
useful product doctrine can be linked to a larger trend in administrative 
law. Following United States v. Mead Corp., courts have been less 
deferential to agency actions that occur outside of formal contexts (i.e., 
without formal adjudication or notice and comment).28 The changes in the 
useful product doctrine mirror the trend set by Mead. The cases prior to 
Burlington Northern, with their narrow application of the doctrine, show 
courts’ willingness to embrace the EPA’s liability determination.29 More 
recent cases, with courts’ broadened application of the doctrine and their 
inclination to allow arrangers to escape from the CERCLA liability net, 
show a lack of willingness to have the EPA’s finding of liability influence 
the outcome of courts’ decisionmaking. 
This Note analyzes the shift away from liability under the useful 
product doctrine, shows that this shift will have a dampening effect on 
litigation in the Superfund world, and correlates this shift with the changes 
in wider administrative law. In Part I, this Note explores the evolution of 
CERCLA arranger liability, from the statutory basis to the cases preceding 
Burlington Northern, that reflected the courts’ tendency to narrowly apply 
the useful product doctrine where there was an arrangement for disposal. 
Part II investigates the modern useful product case law and demonstrates 
how these cases have expanded upon Burlington Northern to shift away 
from a punitive statutory focus to a broader application of the doctrine. Part 
28 See 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001). 
29 This liability finding, the Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO), requires parties to undertake a 
short-term or long-term cleanup of a contaminated site, and is not developed in the context of notice-
and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. See Superfund Unilateral Orders, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-unilateral-orders [https://perma.cc/757V-BVHW] (last 
updated Jan. 5, 2016). 
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III explores the negative impact this shift will have on the Superfund world 
and on the environment. Finally, Part IV theorizes that the change in the 
application of the doctrine can be connected to a larger trend in 
administrative law in which modern courts are less likely to defer to 
informal agency findings and posits that courts should return to a more 
deferential standard. 
I. THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF CERCLA ARRANGER LIABILITY
This Part will provide an overview of CERCLA arranger liability,
focusing on its statutory foundations and interpretive case law. It will start 
by looking directly at the statute to understand what elements must be 
proven for liability to attach. It will then explore useful product cases prior 
to Burlington Northern, addressing three themes that exemplify how the 
courts’ narrow application of the useful product doctrine historically 
imposed broad liability on arrangers. Finally, this Part will identify 
Burlington Northern as the turning point in arranger liability, after which 
courts began to more generously apply the useful product doctrine and 
more narrowly impose liability. 
A. A Brief Introduction to CERCLA Liability and § 107(a)(3)
Congress passed CERCLA30 in 1980 in response to increasingly
problematic releases of hazardous substances into the environment,31 
intending to protect both human and environmental health from any actual 
or threatened releases of pollutants.32 Congress designed CERCLA as a 
broad, strict liability statute to ensure that the costs of responding to any 
release of hazardous substances would be shouldered by those parties 
30  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2012). 
31 In 1978, an investigation at Love Canal, New York found that houses located on a former 
hazardous waste site were contaminated and residents were experiencing health issues including “birth 
defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, liver abnormalities, sores, rectal bleeding, and headaches.” David W. 
Lannetti, Note, “Arranger Liability” Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): Judicial Retreat from Legislative Intent, 40 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 279, 281–82, 282 n.8 (1998).
32 See, e.g., § 9604(a) (allowing the President to respond to releases or threatened releases of 
hazardous substances or contaminants that might be of substantial or imminent harm to public welfare 
or the environment). 
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responsible for said release.33 Liability under CERCLA has often been 
summarized as “the polluter pays.”34 
Four prongs must be met for a party to be liable under CERCLA. 
First, there must be a “release” or “substantial threat” of a release.35 In 
keeping with the broad nature of CERCLA liability, release is expansively 
defined, including all active emissions (discharging, spilling, and dumping) 
as well as more passive emissions (leaking or abandonment of waste that 
leaches into the ground).36 The second prong requires that the release be of 
a “hazardous substance.”37 This is also broadly defined. It includes 
hazardous substances specifically designated in CERCLA, as well as 
hazardous substances so designated by the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air 
Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act.38 
The third prong is met if the release of the hazardous substance comes from 
a “facility.”39 A facility is generously defined and includes “any site or area 
where a hazardous substance has . . . come to be located.”40 Finally, a party 
who meets the first three prongs of CERCLA liability must also belong to 
one of the four categories of PRPs: (1) current owners and operators, (2) 
owners and operators at the time of disposal, (3) persons who “arranged for 
disposal or treatment” of hazardous substances, or (4) persons who 
transported hazardous substances for treatment or disposal.41 
This Note focuses exclusively on PRPs who qualify as arrangers. 
Section 107(a)(3) speaks directly to arranger liability, imposing 
responsibility on any party who “arranged for disposal or treatment . . . of 
hazardous substances.”42 “Disposal” in the arranger context is broadly 
defined and includes “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, 
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste” such that the 
33 S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 13 (1980) (“[T]hose responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or 
injury from [a hazardous release] bear the costs of their actions.”). 
34 E.g., Braunson Virjee, Stimulating the Future of Superfund: Why the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act Calls for a Reinstatement of the Superfund Tax to Polluted Sites in Urban 
Environments, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2010, at 27. 
35 § 9604(a)(1). 
36 Id. § 9601(22) (“The term ‘release’ means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, 
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment 
(including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing 
any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) . . . .”).  
37 Id. § 9607(a)(4). 
38 Id. §§ 9601(14), 9602.  
39 Id. § 9607(a). 
40 Id. § 9601(9). 
41 Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).  
42 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 107(a)(3), 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)) (2012). 
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waste might reach the environment.43 Disposal can be either active 
(dumping, spilling, discharging, placing) or passive (leaking).44 While 
“arranged for” is not statutorily defined, in keeping with the broad nature of 
CERCLA liability, courts have traditionally construed it liberally, as will 
be discussed further in the next Section. 
B. The Useful Product Doctrine Pre-Burlington Northern
The useful product doctrine is a judicially created exception to 
arranger liability in cases where the transfer of a hazardous substance 
served a purpose other than disposal.45 While the useful product doctrine 
narrowed arranger liability in some cases,46 prior to Burlington Northern, it 
was successfully invoked by litigants and applied by courts in very narrow 
circumstances. This Section will explore the circumstances under which the 
useful product doctrine was effectively invoked prior to Burlington 
Northern. It will focus on three themes: (1) the distinction between virgin 
and secondary products, (2) the emphasis on original utility, and (3) the 
low threshold for knowledge and intent. Before Burlington Northern, 
courts across circuits favored virgin materials as useful products, 
emphasized that materials must retain their original use to be useful 
products, and required only general knowledge of the possibility of 
contamination stemming from the sale of a useful product to prove liability. 
43 Id. § 6903(3). “Disposal” is defined in relation to the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Id. § 9601(29). 
44 Tommy Tucker Henson II, What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been: Broader Arranger Liability in 
the Ninth Circuit and Rethinking the Useful Product Doctrine, 38 ENVTL. L. 941, 944–45 (2008).  
45 The Superfund Recycling Equity Act (SREA), an amendment to CERCLA, serves a similar 
purpose to the useful product doctrine. It states: 
[A] person who arranged for recycling of recyclable material shall not be liable under
sections 9607(a)(3) and 9607(a)(4) of this title with respect to such material. . . . [T]he term
‘recyclable material’ means . . . scrap metal, or spent lead-acid . . . batteries, as well as minor
amounts of material incident to or adhering to the scrap material as a result of its normal and
customary use prior to becoming scrap.
§ 9627. This statutory provision provides what is generally referred to as the recycling exemption. The
burden of proof is on the entity to establish that it is shielded from CERCLA liability by the recycling
exemption defense. See EPA, SUPERFUND RECYCLING EQUITY ACT OF 1999: FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN 
A CERCLA ENFORCEMENT CASE 1 (2002), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/srea-
guide-1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6RC-RDKX]. 
46 It is presumed that entities or persons selling useful products are doing so for legitimate reasons 
while entities selling wholly hazardous waste materials are more likely to be doing so to get rid of the 
waste and may be trying to disguise the transfer in such a way that would shield them from arranger 
liability. See Team Enters., LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2011). The 
doctrine shields the transferor from liability in cases where environmental contamination occurs as a 
result of the transferee’s independent use of the hazardous substance. It is a crucial limitation for parties 
who are legitimately transferring materials with hazardous components while attempting to serve a 
beneficial purpose. See Henson, supra note 44, at 955.  
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1. Virgin vs. Secondary Materials.—Before Burlington Northern,
courts drew a sharp distinction between virgin and secondary materials. 
Virgin materials, products that are manufactured to be used in their current 
state,47 were nearly always considered useful products. In 3550 Stevens 
Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank of California, for example, the Ninth 
Circuit exempted a contractor who engaged in asbestos remediation from 
liability in the sale of a hazardous substance that was later disposed of after 
it was used as intended.48 The court stated, “there is no meaningful 
difference for purposes of CERCLA between a party who sells or 
transports a [virgin] product containing or composed of hazardous 
substances for a productive use, and a party who actually puts that product 
to its constructive use . . . .”49 Thus, neither the transfer of the virgin 
material nor the productive use of the virgin material was considered a 
disposal.50 As a matter of simple logic, it makes sense that a product being 
sold in its original state for its intended use would be exempted from 
arranger liability via the useful product doctrine. Entities involved in the 
sale of virgin materials are most likely not trying to disguise a disposal of a 
hazardous material; rather they are engaging in a legitimate business 
relationship—the sale of a useful product—that will have a beneficial 
impact on the economy.51 
While the exemption of virgin materials is fairly straightforward, 
courts have traditionally treated secondary materials very differently. 
Secondary materials can be products like lead slag and dross that contain a 
small percentage of reclaimable constituents,52 products like spent styrene 
contaminated with hazardous substances that must be removed before use,53 
or products like copper slag that generally require disposal but can be sold 
for some other use, like ballast in a log yard.54 Historically, the distinction 
between virgin and secondary products was reasonable: while 
manufacturers of virgin products are selling a new and beneficial material, 
47 Id. at 949. 
48 915 F.2d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990). 
49 Id. at 1362. 
50 Id. 
51 See Team Enters., 647 F.3d at 908. 
52 Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(noting slag and dross resulting from lead smelting operations contain a minority percentage of useful 
lead, and in this case were sold to a lead smelter for lead reclamation). 
53 Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) 
(discussing the transfer of spent styrene back to the manufacturer for removal of contaminants to return 
the styrene to its virgin state). 
54 See La.–Pac. Corp. v. ASARCO Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1570–71 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing how 
logging companies would purchase copper slag to lay on the ground as a “ballast,” which eased 
operations by making the ground firmer). 
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there is the real possibility that producers of secondary materials are trying 
to dispose of otherwise only nominally useful waste products.55 Moreover, 
secondary materials, unlike virgin materials, often contain both reclaimable 
materials and waste products.56 These waste products, most often the 
unwanted consequence of a manufacturing process, must be disposed of in 
one manner or another.57 If contamination occurred in the course of 
attempting to offload waste, the producer of the secondary material should 
be held responsible, consistent with CERCLA’s broad liability scheme.58 
Generally, courts relied on CERCLA’s broad definitions of waste and 
disposal to draw a distinction between waste material and useful products.59 
Courts disregarded the fact that the processing of a secondary material 
might lead to the reclamation of valuable constituents.60 In California 
Department of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., for example, 
slag and dross, byproducts of a manufacturing process, were sold to a lead 
smelter so the smelter could reclaim the valuable lead inside.61 Despite the 
fact that this transaction would directly lead to the generation of a useful 
virgin material, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the 
defendants, finding that “a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that [the 
defendants] sold the by-products of their manufacturing processes 
primarily for treatment and disposal purposes.”62  
Prior to Burlington Northern, courts were generally skeptical of any 
arrangement that did not on its face appear to be a straightforward sale of a 
useful product. A clear example is State of New York v. General Electric 
Co., where the court found that CERCLA liability could not be “facilely 
circumvented” by characterizing arrangements to dispose of a secondary 
material as sales, and that “persons cannot escape liability by ‘contracting 
away’ their responsibility or by alleging that the incident was caused by the 
act or omission of a third party.”63 The threshold for arranger liability for 
those who had transferred a secondary material was quite low. As a result, 
55 Henson, supra note 44, at 950. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See id. 
59 See Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“A person may be held liable as an ‘arranger’ under § 9607(a)(3) only if the material in question 
constitutes ‘waste’ rather than a ‘useful product.’” (first quoting A & W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. 
Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); and then quoting Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 
34 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
60 See Henson, supra note 44, at 949–50. 
61 508 F.3d at 932. 
62 Id. at 939. 
63 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 31 (1980)). 
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courts’ broad interpretation of arranger liability prior to Burlington 
Northern ensured that almost any sale of a secondary material was an 
arrangement for disposal.  
2. Utility: Original Use.—Courts also considered whether a material
had retained its original utility in determining whether a party could escape 
arranger liability. This analysis often overlaps with the distinction between 
secondary and virgin materials, as virgin materials can clearly be used as 
intended and secondary materials generally cannot. In Florida Power & 
Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., the Eleventh Circuit considered whether 
a manufacturer can be held liable for their original sale of transformers, 
after the original purchaser subsequently resold the transformers as scrap to 
a third party.64 The court found that the manufacturer was not liable for the 
initial sale of the new, useful transformers but suggested that there could be 
liability in the subsequent sale of the used transformers as scrap because 
these used transformers no longer retained their original utility.65 The court 
declined to create a per se rule that a seller of an arguably useful product 
can never be an arranger, asserting that this would “frustrate CERCLA’s 
broad remedial purpose” and “be contrary to prevailing case law.”66 
In keeping with the emphasis on original utility, courts also excluded 
from liability secondary materials that had a small percentage of hazardous 
substances that had to be removed for original use to be restored.67 Entities 
that engaged in transactions in which contaminated materials were passed 
off for processing were found to be arranging for disposal. For example, 
the Ninth Circuit in Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. United States 
reversed summary judgment to the defendant PRP and determined that the 
trier of fact could conclude that the sale of contaminated styrene, a 
chemical used in rubber, to a third party for processing was an arrangement 
for disposal.68 The court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the 
styrene could return to its virgin state, could still be used for its original 
purpose, and caused minimal environmental damage.69 
3. Intent, Knowledge, and Control (or Lack Thereof).—As part of an
inquiry into whether a possible arranger intended to dispose of a material, 
courts examined whether a party had knowledge of a possible disposal or 
64 893 F.2d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 1990). 
65 See id. at 1316–19. 
66 Id. at 1318. 
67 See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1994) (per 
curiam). 
68 Id. at 565–66. 
69 See id. at 564. 
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control over said disposal. Pre-Burlington Northern, general knowledge of 
the possibility of contamination was all that courts required in order to 
prove arranger liability.70 While there are circumstances where an entity 
can have knowledge without intent or vice versa, typically knowledge of 
disposal and intent to dispose went hand in hand.71 If no evidence of actual 
knowledge or intent to dispose existed, courts were comfortable relying on 
circumstantial evidence to impute knowledge or intent to a party. For 
example, if a process typically resulted in hazardous contamination of the 
environment, courts were comfortable inferring both intent and knowledge 
from those factual circumstances.72 The Sixth Circuit in United States v. 
Cello-Foil Products, Inc. stated that “intent need not be proven by direct 
evidence, but can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances” when 
evaluating arranger liability.73 The Third Circuit in Morton International, 
Inc. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. similarly adhered to a loose “general 
knowledge” standard in proving intent to dispose, stating that “general 
knowledge that waste disposal is an inherent or inevitable part of the 
process arranged for by the defendant may suffice to establish liability.”74 
The court concluded the defendant likely had knowledge of the possibility 
of environmental hazards related to mercury processing, given its use of 
mercury at its own plant.75  
Courts consistently rejected defendants’ assertions that they cannot be 
held liable because they lacked control over the contamination; a lack of 
control posed no bar to liability. If an entity owned a substance during the 
waste-generating process and demonstrated some measure of knowledge 
that a third party was likely to dispose of the material, they were often 
found liable even if they had no control over the contamination. In United 
States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., the Eighth Circuit found that 
a pesticide company could be liable for spills perpetrated by a formulating 
company to which the pesticide company had supplied pesticides for 
processing.76 Despite the fact that the spills were entirely caused by the 
formulating company, the court rejected the pesticide company’s claim that 
they did not intend to dispose of waste and were only passing on a useful 
70 See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3d Cir. 2003). 
71 See Henson, supra note 44, at 951 (“Intent and knowledge involve highly subjective analyses 
into the actions of the alleged arranger and circumstances surrounding the transaction to determine 
whether the transaction is an arrangement for disposal, and these two factors are used somewhat 
interchangeably.”). 
72 Id. at 951–52. 
73 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996). 
74 Morton, 343 F.3d at 678. 
75 Id. at 682.  
76 872 F.2d 1373, 1380–82 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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product for processing.77 The court noted that such a limited reading of the 
doctrine would frustrate “CERCLA’s ‘overwhelmingly remedial’ statutory 
scheme.”78 Other circuits came to similar conclusions, finding defendants 
liable despite their complete lack of control over the actual contamination.79 
This is similar to courts’ emphasis on materials retaining their original use 
in order to be useful products and requiring only general knowledge of the 
possibility of contamination stemming from the sale of a useful product to 
prove liability. 
C. Burlington Northern: The Beginning of a New Narrative
Burlington Northern represents a sea change in arranger liability and 
in CERCLA jurisprudence generally.80 The case involved an agricultural 
chemical business, Brown & Bryant Inc. (B&B), that operated a chemical 
storage facility adjacent to land owned by two railroads.81 As part of this 
storage business, B&B contracted with Shell for bulk shipping of 
pesticides, including the pesticide D-D, which spilled during delivery and 
contaminated the adjacent parcel of land owned by the railroads.82 Despite 
the role Shell played in the ultimate contamination of the parcel of land, the 
Supreme Court found that Shell was not liable as an arranger.83 
The case raised the threshold of proving arranger liability.84 Where it 
had once been an easy proposition for courts and plaintiffs to establish 
arranger liability,85 liability after Burlington Northern requires much more 
substantial proof of wrongdoing. In particular, Burlington Northern 
transformed the intent standard: simple evidence of a party’s knowledge of 
potential environmental contamination was no longer enough to infer intent 
77 Id. at 1380. 
78 Id. (quoting United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
79 See Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(finding that the entity who owned raw materials arranged for disposal of toxic substances when they 
supplied toxic materials to a third-party formulator for processing that later ended up contaminating the 
environment, despite the fact that complete control was ceded to the formulator). 
80 See Brown, supra note 10, at 507.  
81 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602–03 (2009).  
82 Id. at 603–04. 
83 Id. at 619. 
84 See Jon-Erik W. Magnus, Comment, Lyon’s Roar, Then a Whimper: The Demise of Broad 
Arranger Liability in the Ninth Circuit After the Supreme Court’s Decision in Burlington Northern, 
3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 427, 428 (2010) (“The consequence of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Burlington Northern is a collective sigh of relief from products manufacturers that would have 
otherwise been subjected to the broad theory of arranger liability . . . .”). 
85 See supra Section I.B. 
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and trigger arranger liability.86 The Court stated that “[i]n order to qualify 
as an arranger, Shell must have entered into the sale . . . with the intention 
that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during the transfer 
process.”87 The intent standard shifted from a general knowledge threshold 
to one of specific intent to dispose of hazardous substances within the 
transaction.88 
As part of the intent inquiry, the Court also considered the 
precautionary efforts that Shell had taken to prevent spills.89 While circuit 
court precedent provided that circumstantial evidence could be used in 
making the determination of whether a transaction constituted the sale of a 
useful product,90 Burlington Northern transformed how circumstantial 
evidence was used. The Court used circumstantial evidence to look beyond 
the nature of the transaction to understand the more holistic actions of the 
potential arranger. It pointed to the fact that Shell had taken precautions 
against spills, which included providing its distributors with safety manuals 
and offering discounts if they took certain safety precautions.91 
Significantly, this is an expansion of the use of circumstantial evidence to 
include general exculpatory information, as opposed to the use of 
circumstantial evidence that presumed that the entity was at fault.92  
Ultimately, Burlington Northern was a significant blow to products-
based CERCLA liability. Prior to Burlington Northern, it was possible for 
PRPs to pursue a contribution action against any product manufacturer that 
had generated a secondary product that had ultimately contaminated the 
environment.93 Where a secondary material ultimately contaminated the 
environment, courts relied on their past orientation towards broad liability 
86 The Court cautioned that “knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity ‘planned for’ 
the disposal, particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an 
unused, useful product.” Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 612; see also Lawrence, supra note 15, at 
49–50 (“The Burlington Northern opinion adds a clear ‘intent-to-dispose’ requirement for courts to find 
a party liable as an arranger under section 107(a)(3).”). 
87 Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added). 
88 See Brown, supra note 10, at 508 (“The Court’s holding indicates a dramatic change from 
previous decisions where plaintiffs were once able to impose strict liability against defendants under 
CERCLA who had no actual knowledge of the illegal disposal.”). 
89 Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 613; see Walewska Watkins, Note, Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States: The Supreme Court Arranges for Disposal of CERCLA’s Strict 
Liability, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 215 (2009). 
90 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
91 Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 613.  
92 Recall the general knowledge standard established in cases prior to Burlington Northern in 
which courts required only evidence of general knowledge of the possibility of contamination for 
liability to attach. See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3d Cir. 
2003); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380–82 (8th Cir. 1989). 
93 Magnus, supra note 84, at 452. 
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to resolve issues within the liability penumbra.94 If courts sensed any gaps 
in CERCLA liability, they pointed to the statutory emphasis on ensuring 
that all parties were held responsible for cleanup.95 However, by requiring 
clear intent to dispose, the Court in Burlington Northern shifted away from 
this presumption of broad liability to a more permissive approach that 
allowed Shell, a party that may have previously been caught in the arranger 
liability net, to escape fault.96  
While Burlington Northern did change the intent inquiry by making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to establish the requisite intent necessary to 
impose arranger liability, it did not conclusively establish how the intent 
analysis should be completed by the lower courts.97 The case required more 
substantial evidence of wrongdoing beyond mere knowledge and 
considered some exculpatory circumstantial evidence in assigning arranger 
liability but it did not draw bright lines as to what factors exactly should be 
weighed in the arranger liability inquiry. Following Burlington Northern, 
lower courts took advantage of the gaps in the case to develop an even 
more lenient approach to the useful product doctrine, as will be discussed 
in the following Part.  
II. SHIFTING USE OF THE DOCTRINE
Following the Court’s decision in Burlington Northern, the useful 
product doctrine has become an increasingly effective defensive tool for 
PRPs who are seeking to escape arranger liability. Lower courts have 
expanded upon the transformation of the intent standard laid out in 
Burlington Northern in order to dramatically narrow liability for arrangers 
under the useful product doctrine.  
This Part will return to the three themes examined in Part I and show 
how these themes narrowed arranger liability. On the first theme, the 
distinction between virgin and secondary products, courts have become 
94 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled on other 
grounds by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
95 See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(finding that a per se rule absolving manufacturers of liability would “frustrate CERCLA’s broad 
remedial purpose”). 
96 556 U.S. at 613. This foreshadows the shift that occurred in the useful product doctrine, as will 
be discussed in Part II. 
97 See Heidi Rasmussen, Re-“Arranging” CERCLA Liability: What Is the State of Arranger 
Liability Post-Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States?, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 
381, 382 (2015) (“Scholars and potential arrangers hoped that Burlington Northern would provide 
much-needed clarification for the unique category of CERCLA arranger liability. Unfortunately, 
regarding arranger liability specifically, some scholars indicate that, even after Burlington Northern, 
there is still a need for clarification.”).  
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much more willing to accept secondary products as useful products.98 On 
the second theme, the requirement of original utility, courts have 
determined that materials no longer need to retain their full original utility 
to be considered useful products.99 On the third theme, intent, courts have 
established a higher standard to prove intent, emphasizing control over the 
material and direct knowledge of disposal.100 Finally, this Part will consider 
the fact that courts have become increasingly willing to consider 
circumstantial evidence to fill evidentiary gaps in favor of the defendant 
PRPs.101 This Part will conclude with a reflection on how this shift indicates 
a subversion of the values of the statute as a whole, from punitive to more 
permissive, moving the statute back to its common law roots.  
A. Secondary Products: Neither New nor Useful
Prior to Burlington Northern, courts drew a hard line between virgin 
and secondary products. Virgin products were generally considered useful 
products102 while secondary products were rarely considered as such, even 
in light of evidence of their utility.103 However, since Burlington Northern, 
despite the fact that the Court did not speak directly to this issue, lower 
courts have softened their approach to secondary products, such that today, 
there is no longer a hard and fast distinction between virgin and secondary 
materials in the useful product realm. For example, the Seventh Circuit 
found that a secondary byproduct of the paper milling process was 
considered a useful product even though it was not a virgin product.104 The 
Fourth Circuit similarly found that used transformers were considered a 
useful product despite the fact that they were a secondary product and not a 
virgin material.105 The Eighth Circuit also found that buildings 
contaminated with toxic chemicals could be a useful product even though 
they were decisively not a virgin material.106 
This dissolution of the distinction between secondary and virgin 
products has gone hand in hand with a loosening or outright abandonment 
of the original utility requirement. Courts prior to Burlington Northern 
98 See infra Section II.A.  
99 See infra Section II.A. 
100 See infra Section II.B. 
101 See infra Section II.C. 
102 See, e.g., 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
103 See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 
2007); Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 
104 NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 705–07 (7th Cir. 2014). 
105 See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 153–54 (4th Cir. 2015). 
106 See United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 350–51 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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emphasized the need for materials to retain their original utility in order for 
them to meet the useful product standard.107 By contrast, recent decisions 
have allowed potential arrangers to invoke the useful product doctrine in 
instances where a material was conclusively unusable for its original 
purpose. In NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., the Seventh 
Circuit asserted that a material does not need to retain its original utility to 
be considered useful.108 The court emphasized the fact that the material, 
despite the fact that it was not useful for its original purpose as carbonless 
copy paper, was indeed useful because it was an essential input for the 
purchaser’s process as recyclable fiber.109 The court, unlike its predecessors 
that excluded secondary materials that were contaminated with a minority 
percentage of a hazardous substance,110 overlooked the hazardous nature of 
the secondary byproduct and focused instead on the material’s utility.111 
The Fourth Circuit in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 
similarly considered “the usefulness of the materials in the condition in 
which they were sold” to support a finding that the defendant did not 
arrange for disposal.112  
Recent courts, by opening the door to secondary products that do not 
retain their original utility, have widened the range of scenarios in which 
the useful product doctrine can be effectively raised and, consequently, 
have made it easier for defendant PRPs to escape arranger liability even in 
cases where a secondary product has clearly contaminated the 
environment.113 This more lenient approach to secondary materials is not a 
case of courts wanting to incentivize recycling because there is already a 
statutory section specifically dealing with exempting recycling from 
CERCLA liability.114  
B. Higher Standard for Proving Intent
In addition to changing the utility standard and opening up the 
possibility of secondary materials qualifying as useful products, courts 
107 See Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 566. 
108 768 F.3d at 707. 
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 566.  
111 See NCR Corp., 768 F.3d at 707. 
112 781 F.3d 129, 153–55 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville 
& Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
113 See, e.g., United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 351 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing summary 
judgment on the issue of arranger liability for a company that had sold buildings with large amounts of 
toxic PCB insulation that had contaminated the environment, because while the buildings were largely 
worthless and contaminated, some parts were still useful).  
114 For more information on the Superfund Recycling Equity Act (SREA), see supra note 45. 
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have also raised the standard for proving intent to dispose, making it easier 
for defendant PRPs to invoke the useful product doctrine.115 While 
Burlington Northern required a heightened intent inquiry, courts have gone 
beyond the Court’s requirements in the useful product arena. The recent 
useful product decisions have emphasized that control over disposal is a 
critical element in proving intent to dispose and thus in proving arranger 
liability—a drastic change from the pre-Burlington Northern jurisprudence. 
In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit found that the appellee was not 
an arranger in part because it “lacked knowledge of or control over what 
[the buyer] chose to do with the transformers [it] acquired.”116 In Team 
Enterprises, LLC v. Western Investment Real Estate Trust, the Ninth 
Circuit similarly found that the manufacturer did not exercise sufficient 
control over the operator’s disposal process such that it could be liable as 
an arranger.117 This is in direct contrast to the pre-Burlington Northern 
cases where mere knowledge of the possibility of disposal was enough to 
prove intent to arrange for disposal.118 
In addition to the emphasis on control, courts have also stated that 
specific knowledge of disposal is needed in order to prove arranger 
liability.119 By requiring direct knowledge of disposal, something not 
specifically required by the Court in Burlington Northern, lower courts 
have stretched Burlington Northern beyond its holding.120 Unlike earlier 
courts that were satisfied with evidence of the PRP’s general knowledge of 
the possibility of contamination to prove intent to dispose, recent courts 
have raised this standard, stating that more than general knowledge is 
needed to prove intent. Demonstrative of this trend, the Seventh Circuit in 
NCR Corp. held that the appellant’s mere indifference to the fact that the 
byproduct could be released into the environment was not enough to show 
intent to dispose, and therefore, insufficient to prove arranger liability.121 
115 Courts have made it clear that intent is a requisite part of being liable as an arranger. See United 
States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (“Whatever else 
‘otherwise arranged for disposal’ means . . . it does not apply to situations where there was no intent to 
dispose of a hazardous substance.”), rev’d on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996). 
116 781 F.3d at 152. 
117 647 F.3d 901, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2011). 
118 See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[G]eneral 
knowledge that waste disposal is an inherent or inevitable part of the process arranged for by the 
defendant may suffice to establish liability.”). 
119 See NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 706 (7th Cir. 2014); Team 
Enters., 647 F.3d at 908–09. 
120 While the Court found that “knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity ‘planned for’ 
the disposal,” it did not require specific knowledge of the buyer’s disposal plans in order to impose 
arranger liability. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 612 (2009). 
121 768 F.3d at 706–07. 
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Similarly, in Team Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit found that actions taken 
with the mere knowledge of future disposal were not enough to show intent 
to dispose.122 The Ninth Circuit, interpreting Burlington Northern, asserted 
that, “[w]hile actions taken with the intent to dispose of a hazardous 
substance are sufficient for arranger liability, actions taken with the mere 
knowledge of such future disposal are not.”123 This emphasis on both 
control and specific knowledge of disposal raises the standard for proving 
intent to dispose such that it is easier for defendant arrangers to invoke the 
useful product doctrine and evade arranger liability.124  
C. Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Show Intent
Recent cases have also demonstrated an increasing willingness to use 
circumstantial evidence to satisfy the useful product exemption. Often, 
circumstantial evidence is the only evidence available. Because of the long 
and complicated histories of many CERCLA useful product cases, there are 
often evidentiary gaps regarding key issues such as intent.125 Accordingly, 
and playing on the Burlington Northern idea that the broader circumstances 
of the transaction can be considered, courts have expanded their analysis of 
the useful product exemption to consider a holistic view of the transaction. 
As part of this shift, two categories of circumstantial evidence have been 
used to prove arrangement for disposal, both of which will be examined 
here: management of the material prior to sale and the value of the 
material. 
122 647 F.3d at 908–09. 
123 Id. at 908 (citing Burlington Northern, 556 U.S at 612). 
124 The court in United States v. Dico, Inc. went a step further, indicating that a party could escape 
arranger liability even if it demonstrated intent to dispose. 808 F.3d 342, 349 (8th Cir. 2015) (“A party 
may sell a still ‘useful’ product, i.e., fit either for its intended purpose or some other purpose useful to 
the buyer, with the full intention to rid itself of environmental liability rather than a legitimate sale, for 
example where the cost of disposal or contamination remediation would greatly exceed its purchase 
price (e.g., selling a working and useful piece of machinery for $10,000 that comes along with a 
$100,000 price tag for remediation costs).”). 
125 Superfund sites have long histories. Many cleanups take decades. See Financial Assurance, 
Bonding and CERCLA 108b, EARTHWORKS, https://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/financial
_assurance_bonding_and_cercla_108b#.VpfFsJMrKT8 [https://perma.cc/8X8B-3K4V] (citing an EPA 
report stating that 59% of contaminated mining sites need around forty years of cleanup efforts). 
Contamination may have occurred far before the problem was detected for liability purposes. For 
example, the Fox River was contaminated in the 1950s, PCBs in the sediment were detected in the 
1980s, and a cleanup plan was not proposed until 2001. See WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. & EPA, 
PROPOSED REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN: LOWER FOX RIVER AND GREEN BAY 6 (2001), 
http://www3.epa.gov/region5/cleanup/foxriver/pdfs/proposed_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ8D-
DBTN]. As of 2016, the cleanup was still ongoing. See Lower Fox River, supra note 3. Because of this, 
documents showing a party’s specific involvement with a contaminated site may be old or incomplete. 
Witnesses similarly may be difficult to locate or even deceased. 
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Courts have considered how the defendant PRP managed the material 
at issue before selling it to the party that contaminated the environment. If 
the material was carefully handled prior to the sale, courts tend to view this 
as evidence that there was no intent to dispose.126 On the other hand, if the 
material was treated more like waste prior to sale, this treatment indicates 
that there likely was intent to dispose.127 The Fourth Circuit in 
Consolidation Coal considered the management of used transformers prior 
to sale to indicate that the appellee had sold a useful product.128 The court 
found that the transformers had been carefully handled because they had 
been largely drained of PCB-laden oil and had been capped during 
transfer.129 In reality, there are many other reasons for the appellee’s 
actions. Capping and draining could indicate that the PRP wanted to avoid 
contamination prior to or during transfer, for which they could be liable 
under CERCLA.130 Although the fact that the appellee carefully handled the 
transformers does not entirely indicate that the transformers are useful 
products, this use of circumstantial evidence is in keeping with the courts’ 
willingness to take a more expansive view of the useful product doctrine. 
Courts have also used this circumstantial factor to find intent to 
dispose, but in those cases, courts required the treatment of the material to 
clearly indicate that a disposal was occurring. For example, in United 
States v. General Electric Co., the First Circuit found that drums of scrap 
chemicals were treated so poorly prior to sale that they could not construe 
this management as anything but intent to dispose.131 They pointed to the 
fact that the drums were stored in a salvage yard and that no quality control 
measures whatsoever were taken to ensure the continued integrity of the 
chemicals.132  
Beyond the treatment of material, courts have also looked at the value 
of the material to determine whether there was a sale of a useful product or 
whether the transaction was simply a disposal. As part of this analysis, 
courts have considered the price at which the material was sold, whether 
multiple buyers were considered, and how the materials were valued by the 
126 See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 153–54 (4th Cir. 2015). 
127 See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 670 F.3d 377, 385–86 (1st Cir. 2012). 
128 781 F.3d at 153–54. 
129 Id. at 154. 
130 If the contamination had occurred prior to transfer, they could be liable as an owner or operator; 
if it occurred during transfer, they could be liable as a transporter under the statute. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(1)–(4) (2012). 
131 670 F.3d at 385–86.
132 Id. 
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seller prior to the sale.133 The Fourth Circuit in Consolidation Coal found 
that the transformers at issue had an “unquestionably positive commercial 
value,” demonstrated by the fact that both the seller and buyer profited 
from the sale.134 The seller recovered revenue beyond the scrap value of the 
transformer and the buyer resold some of the transformers for a profit.135 
Furthermore, there was a viable market for the transformers as they were 
sold at a competitive auction, with multiple buyers participating.136 The 
Seventh Circuit in NCR Corp. similarly used evidence of the byproduct’s 
value to find no arranger liability.137 The appellant had invested resources 
in processing the byproduct before sale, and then placed the byproduct into 
a competitive market in an attempt to recoup some of the production costs 
expended in preparing the byproduct.138 The competitive pricing and viable 
market demonstrated the value of the byproduct, which supported the 
court’s conclusion that this was the sale of a useful product.139  
Courts’ willingness to read intent into this evidence about the value of 
the product is a significant departure from the pre-Burlington Northern 
courts that ended the intent inquiry after finding knowledge of the mere 
possibility of contamination occurring as the result of the sale of the 
material.140 Moreover, it shows that recent courts have become increasingly 
keen to open up the scope of the inquiry to facilitate the successful use of 
the useful product doctrine. In reality, however, the fact that the seller made 
some marginal profit in no way conclusively means they were not 
disposing of the materials.  
There have been cases in which the value of the material at issue has 
swung the pendulum the other way and indicated that the material was not 
a useful product. In General Electric, the First Circuit found GE to be 
liable as an arranger where circumstantial evidence indicated that the scrap 
chemicals at issue completely lacked value.141 The court examined whether 
the materials had been advertised to multiple buyers, whether there was a 
133 United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 360 (8th Cir. 2015) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Gen. Elec. Co., 670 F.3d at 385–86. 
134 781 F.3d at 152–53. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 152. 
137 768 F.3d 682, 704–07 (7th Cir. 2014). 
138 Id. at 704–05. 
139 Id. at 704–07. 
140 Compare Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying 
a loose general knowledge standard for arranger liability), with NCR Corp., 768 F.3d at 706 (stating that 
the appellant’s indifference to the fact that the byproduct could be released into the environment was 
not enough to show intent to dispose). 
141 670 F.3d 377, 384–85 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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general demand, and whether the chemicals had been competitively 
priced.142 It was only after finding that the material had no value that the 
court found arranger liability.143 The court’s willingness to even entertain 
these peripheral issues shows a shift from a narrow inquiry around a useful 
product to a more expansive one that makes it more difficult to impose 
liability.  
A court’s willingness to use circumstantial factors as part of the intent 
inquiry shows the shift from a narrow use of the doctrine to a broader use, 
where the standard moved from a question of whether a party knew or 
should have known that a disposal would occur to an examination of 
mitigating circumstances that show the transaction was a sale and not a 
disposal. The lower courts expanded on the mandate laid out by the Court 
in Burlington Northern to develop a permissive, pro-defendant approach to 
the useful product doctrine.  
D. Shifting Doctrine and a Return to the Common Law
These changes in the doctrine indicate a subversion of the values of 
the statute, as stated by Congress when CERCLA was passed. CERCLA 
has traditionally placed a heavy emphasis on broad, punitive liability.144 
This emphasis on wide-reaching liability is consistent with the outcome of 
the cases decided before Burlington Northern in which there was a heavy 
burden on the defendant PRPs to demonstrate that the products at issue 
were indeed useful.145 Courts pre-Burlington Northern did not consider 
secondary products, even those with some demonstrated usefulness, to be 
useful products, and the mere possibility of knowledge of disposal was 
enough to prove intent to dispose. Justice Brennan in Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co. expounded upon the broad liability standard that courts 
embraced prior to Burlington Northern: “The remedy that Congress felt it 
needed in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible 
for hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the costs 
of cleanup.”146 Recent decisions have subverted this broad liability 
standard, moving the statute back to its common law roots, where stringent 
causation requirements allow defendants to escape liability. 
142 The court found that none of these three things had occurred. See id. at 386. 
143 See id. at 384–91. 
144 See In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1993) (“CERCLA, as a strict 
liability statute . . . can be terribly unfair in certain instances in which parties may be required to pay 
huge amounts for damages to which their acts did not contribute.”). 
145 See cases cited supra note 17. 
146 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality opinion). This case was overruled by Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), but this subsequent ruling dealt with the Eleventh Amendment issue and
was not a CERCLA case, so Justice Brennan’s language is still relevant.
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Criticism of CERCLA for this liability-at-any-cost standard can be 
easily found in past cases.147 Since Burlington Northern, courts in the useful 
product arena have relied on prior disapproval of CERCLA’s draconian 
nature and have welcomed a more permissive approach, providing greater 
leniency for defendants. Courts’ use of the intent element has had the 
greatest impact on CERCLA liability. In doing so, courts may believe that 
they are focusing on ensuring that the parties truly responsible for the worst 
parts of the contamination are responsible for funding the cleanup and that 
less directly responsible parties, like arrangers selling arguably useful 
products, escape the liability net. 
However, by imposing a much higher standard of intent, courts are 
actively subverting the original intention of CERCLA to avoid liability 
loopholes based on difficult-to-prove, subjective criteria.148 One of the 
animating factors behind the major environmental statutes was the need to 
develop causes of action that would serve as effective stand-ins for the 
common law causes of action that courts had previously relied upon in the 
environmental context.149 Claims of trespass, nuisance, and negligence 
dominated early environmental cases.150 One of the main challenges of 
using common law causes of action was establishing causation between the 
harm and the defendant’s conduct.151 Given the complicated nature of 
environmental contamination, direct causation was difficult to prove and 
often depended on the amorphous notions of “fault” and “state of mind” 
147 Nagle, supra note 23, at 1446 (“Criticisms of CERCLA as substantively inequitable, harsh, or 
unfair fill the reported cases. . . . CERCLA’s imposition of strict, joint and several, and retroactive 
liability without regard to causation has been the target of countless complaints.”). 
148 See Lannetti, supra note 31, at 280 (arguing that CERCLA’s legislative history and the plain 
language of the statute itself indicate that Congress intended to hold arrangers strictly liable). 
149 See Richard A. Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental Protection: How the Modern 
Environmental Movement Has Lost Its Way, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 149 (2015) (“The advent of 
statutes changed [the common law] regime . . . . [T]he legislature intervened in order to set explicit 
standards of conduct that major enterprises . . . had to comply with in order to undertake their activities. 
There are all sorts of good reasons for imposing these statutory duties. The harms in question could be 
quite serious and perhaps irreparable. The actors may not have the resources to pay damages. The 
needed safeguards are easy to understand and in most cases to implement.”). 
150 See COLL. OF AGRIC. & LIFE SCIS. AT N.C. STATE UNIV., COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIES 1, https://www.cals.ncsu.edu/course/are309b/Common_Law_Environmental_Remedies.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J74H-HT6S]. 
151 Common law causes of action like nuisance that attempt to balance the interests of the two 
parties face difficulty with environmental actions because the natural resources involved do not have a 
market and therefore cannot be concretely valued. C.A. ULIBARRI & K.F. WELLMAN, NATURAL 
RESOURCE VALUATION: A PRIMER ON CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 43 (1997), 
http://www.environmentalmanager.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/valuation_primer_from_doe.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V4KK-ETBJ] (“Natural resource and environmental valuation is difficult, even when 
there is relative certainty over prevailing economic and environmental conditions.”). 
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that were difficult to quantify and could be easily manipulated by the 
parties.152 
CERCLA set out to replace the unwieldy and ineffective common law 
causes of action with something more concrete that could effectively 
impose liability on parties that may not be directly tied to the 
contamination but are nevertheless responsible in some manner.153 Instead 
of direct causation, CERCLA only requires a party show that there is a 
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at a facility and that 
the defendant falls into one of the four categories of liability.154 This 
attenuated causation requirement was a response to the difficulties of 
proving causation under common law. It widened the liability net to 
include many parties who would not otherwise be liable under a common 
law standard. While parties who fall outside the reach of common law may 
argue that they are not directly responsible for releases, CERCLA 
addressed the complexity and expense of cleanups and the need for all 
players involved in a contamination to be on the hook for the cost. 
CERCLA eschewed the constraints of common law causes of action and 
provided the government and private parties with a more efficient 
mechanism to facilitate cleanups and to recover costs associated with these 
actions.155  
Instead of upholding CERCLA’s purpose as a vehicle that can 
facilitate cleanups and cost recovery by providing a concrete statutory 
framework to impose liability on polluters, recent courts in the useful 
product context have begun to reinsert common law elements of fault and 
state of mind.156 In doing so, they are pulling CERCLA in the direction of 
152 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), reveals the difficulties with causation in early 
common law cases. In this case, Missouri sued Illinois for dumping sewage into the Mississippi River 
causing a typhoid outbreak. Id. at 523. However, Missouri could not effectively connect the increase in 
deaths from typhoid in their state to Illinois’ dumping of sewage. Id. The Court was skeptical, pointing 
to possible intervening causes and the lack of direct evidence connecting Illinois’s specific actions to 
the outcome in Missouri. Id. 
153 For example, CERCLA imposes liability on current owner/operators, even if they were not the 
owner or operator at the time of the disposal. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). 
154 Id.; see also Suzanne C. Baskin & Phillip D. Reed, “Arranging For Disposal” Under CERCLA: 
When Is a Generator Liable?, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10160, 10161 (1985) (“The government has won every 
battle . . . on its theory that CERCLA requires only limited proof of causation.”). 
155 See Alexandra B. Klass, CERCLA, State Law, and Federalism in the 21st Century, 41 SW. L.
REV. 679, 683 (2012). 
156 Such considerations, however, should not matter under CERCLA. See Lynda J. Oswald, Strict 
Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 635 
(1993) (“CERCLA imposes strict liability; considerations of fault or blameworthiness are, by definition, 
irrelevant under its terms.”).  
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requiring proof of direct causation and away from the attenuated causation 
scheme that Congress intended it to be.  
III. A REAL IMPACT: HOW THE SHIFT WILL AFFECT SUPERFUND
This shift away from broad liability in the useful product arena will
have a real impact on the landscape of Superfund litigation.157 This Part will 
examine the impact that this shift will have on the major players in the 
Superfund world: the PRPs, the EPA, and the environment. It will argue 
that this shift conclusively favors defendant arranger PRPs, will have a 
dampening effect on agency enforcement action, and a corresponding 
negative effect on Superfund cleanup efforts, ultimately wreaking havoc on 
human and environmental health. 
PRPs who are being pursued as arrangers will now have the upper 
hand in this area. PRPs being sought as owners or operators of 
contaminated properties will be more reticent to pursue arrangers in 
contribution actions given the changing landscape of useful product 
litigation. Additionally, the EPA will be similarly wary when it comes to 
backing these arranger liability actions brought by owners and operators by 
issuing orders against arrangers that might support a contribution suit. 
These high litigation risks will act to shield arrangers from being held 
liable under CERCLA. 
The increasing focus on circumstantial evidence to prove intent 
benefits arrangers. The incentive for arrangers to escape the liability net is 
great; many millions of dollars are at stake. For example, in the litigation 
around the Fox River, settlements totaled about $55 million.158 Since 
Burlington Northern, PRPs have benefitted from courts examining the 
holistic landscape of the transaction. Arranger PRPs and the attorneys 
representing them will focus on building a narrative around their liability 
using circumstantial evidence. While the useful product standard is not so 
low that courts will simply accept the PRPs’ characterization of the 
transaction as either a sale or disposal, courts are more willing to look at 
157 EPA’s Superfund program, created in 1980, identifies and responds to contaminated sites, 
environmental emergencies, and natural disasters. See CENTER FOR HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT & JUSTICE, 
SUPERFUND: POLLUTERS PAY SO CHILDREN CAN PLAY 4 (2015), http://chej.org/wp-
content/uploads/Superfund-35th-Anniversary-Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NQ2-FNF4]; Superfund, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund [https://perma.cc/ZGZ4-PAUA] (last updated June 21, 2016). 
Congress allocates funds to the Superfund program each year, but the program is also funded by 
contributions from polluters responsible for contamination. See CENTER FOR HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT & 
JUSTICE, supra, at 5. 
158 Lower Fox River, supra note 3. This number does not include attorney’s fees or other litigation 
related costs. See id. 
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other factors than they were prior to Burlington Northern.159 Circumstantial 
evidence such as the value of the material and how the material was 
managed prior to sale can be preserved such that a good story can be told 
that will support the contention that the material at issue is a useful 
product.160 Forward-thinking counsel may even take steps to encourage 
clients to handle materials more like a useful product and less like waste in 
anticipation of possible litigation. 
While the shift to a permissive application of the useful product 
doctrine will result in lenience for arranger PRPs, this shift will negatively 
impact the EPA’s enforcement strategy. One problem with the expansion of 
the useful product exception to liability is that at some Superfund sites, the 
primary responsible actor has been identified but may be defunct or 
otherwise lack the ability to pay.161 Because of this, the agency has to find 
creative ways to fund cleanups. These include the pursuit of multiple 
arrangers to fund a cleanup in cases where the major players cannot do 
so.162 In these cases, arrangers are often the only actors who both 
contributed to the contamination and are readily identifiable as viable 
financiers for cleanup.163 In other cases, a smaller site, such as a battery 
salvage and lead recovery site,164 could be impacted greatly by the useful 
159 See, e.g., United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 350–51 (8th Cir. 2015) (considering the 
value of the contaminated buildings as part of the useful product inquiry); Consolidation Coal Co. v. 
Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 153–54 (4th Cir. 2015) (considering the handling of the transformers 
prior to sale as part of the useful product inquiry). 
160 Cf. Chris Dow, A Tale of Two Rivers: An Analysis of Different Approaches to Proving Intent for 
CERCLA Arranger Liability, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10699, 10705 (2015). 
161 An EPA guidance document states: “In some instances, companies have moved or changed 
names, requiring several service attempts, or the company may turn out to be bankrupt or defunct.” 
EPA, GOWANUS CANAL SUPERFUND SITE POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTY (PRP) SEARCH STATUS 1 
(2012), http://www3.epa.gov/region02/superfund/npl/gowanus/pdf/potentially_responsible_party_
prpsearch_jan2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JF3-VLYM]. 
162 See David D. Cooke & Robert D. Wyatt, Supreme Court Decision Provides Framework for 
Limiting Superfund Cleanup Liability, ALLEN MATKINS (May 4, 2004), http://www.allenmatkins.com/
Publications/Legal-Alerts/2009/05/08_05_2009_Supreme-Court-decision-provides-framework-for-
limiting-Superfund.aspx [https://perma.cc/49D5-ZXK4] (stating that one implication of Burlington 
Northern would be “the risk that more ‘orphan shares’—shares of cleanup costs allocated to parties that 
are dead, defunct or insolvent—will be unfunded”). 
163 Hundreds of lead smelting facilities operated in the United States. from 1930 to 1969, and while 
these facilities are now largely defunct, they have left behind high levels of lead contamination. Ghost 
Factories, SCI. AM. (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ghost-factories/ 
[https://perma.cc/F76E-8YNQ]. Lead smelters typically received products containing varying amounts 
of lead from manufacturers and then would smelt them to recover the lead. See Cal. Dep’t of Toxic 
Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2007). These arranging 
manufacturers could potentially finance cleanups in cases where the lead smelter is defunct. 
164 See Salman Zafar, The Problem of Used Lead-Acid Batteries, ECOMENA (Nov. 20, 2014, 4:04 
AM), http://www.ecomena.org/managing-lead-acid-batteries/ [https://perma.cc/UY6W-ZGN3] 
(describing the process of recycling lead acid batteries and recovering the lead). 
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product doctrine as the majority of the actors contributing to contamination 
would be arrangers, potentially leaving no solvent party legally responsible 
for the cleanup. 
The recent case law will likely discourage the pursuit of suits against 
arrangers because of the litigation risks and high costs of building a case 
against a potential arranger.165 Consequently, the shift in the doctrine will 
discourage the EPA from issuing orders finding PRPs liable as arrangers as 
these orders may be reversed on appeal or complied with under protest 
because the arrangers may believe they have case law on their side. An 
arranger could also complete the cleanup and then sue Superfund for 
reimbursement,166 arguing that it was not a PRP in the first place given the 
useful product case law. This more lenient approach to the useful product 
doctrine could also result in a reduced deterrent effect for arrangers. 
Arrangers may now be able to behave more recklessly as long as they are 
careful to act in such a way that they take advantage of the loopholes the 
courts have created. 
The enforcement pressure placed on the EPA by the shift in the useful 
product doctrine will likely have an impact on the funding for Superfund as 
well. Even before Burlington Northern, there was already pressure on 
funding.167 Between 2000 and 2010, the EPA allocated about $243 million 
per year for Superfund cleanups, but estimated that between $335 million 
and $681 million would be needed annually in subsequent years.168 Because 
of funding pressure, the National Remedy Review Board streamlines 
CERCLA cleanups.169 If the liability net has shrunk because of the recent 
165 Litigation costs for building a CERCLA case are already high, and courts allow for fee shifting 
in very limited circumstances. See K. Jason Northcutt, Reviving CERCLA’s Liability: Why Government 
Agencies Should Recover Their Attorneys’ Fees in Response Cost Recovery Actions, 27 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 779, 782 (2000). The added complications of rebutting the circumstantial and often vague 
evidence around the sale of a useful product further increase costs. 
166 Supreme Court Says “Yes,” Private Parties Can Sue Under Superfund to Recover Voluntary 
Cleanup Costs, SPENCER FANE (June 12, 2007), http://www.spencerfane.com/supreme-court- 
says-yes-private-parties-can-sue-under-superfund-to-recover-voluntary-cleanup-costs-06-12-2007/ 
[https://perma.cc/V2TP-JRDA]. 
167 Laurel Adams, EPA Superfund Cleanup Costs Outstrip Funding, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY 
(Feb. 22, 2011, 7:53 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/02/22/2121/epa-superfund-cleanup-
costs-outstrip-funding [https://perma.cc/E6PX-EW8C]. 
168 Id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-380, SUPERFUND: EPA’S ESTIMATED COSTS
TO REMEDIATE EXISTING SITES EXCEED CURRENT FUNDING LEVELS, AND MORE SITES ARE EXPECTED 
TO BE ADDED TO THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST (2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10380.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z68Q-76JG]. 
169 National Remedy Review Board (NRRB), EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/national-remedy-
review-board-nrrb [https://perma.cc/PU3T-UPD6] (last updated Aug. 15, 2016) (explaining that after 
the EPA adds Superfund sites to the National Priorities List, the NRRB reviews proposed cleanup 
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shifts in the useful product doctrine, the number of PRPs who can 
contribute to funding cleanups is also smaller.170 Naturally, this will lead to 
further cuts in funding. 
As mentioned above, the narrowing of arranger liability may mean 
that the owner and operator PRPs will pay more to clean up sites. However, 
at sites where there is no viable entity responsible for the contamination, 
the EPA pays for the cleanup.171 There is still a significant gap in funding 
for cleanups such that EPA-funded cleanup may not always be fiscally 
feasible.172 The EPA budget for 2016 allocated $190.7 million for the 
Superfund Emergency Response and Removal program.173 In addition to 
funding these emergency actions, the EPA also encourages PRPs to 
conduct removal actions.174 While there is also funding for remedial 
cleanups, such funds are allocated to completing projects already in various 
stages of the response process, not to new cleanups.175 
All of these financial shortcomings culminate in the actual impact that 
this shift towards decreased liability will have on the environment itself—
an impact that is potentially catastrophic. With the agency unable to 
flexibly enforce against arrangers, and owners and operators similarly 
constrained by litigation risks, there will simply be less ability to push 
through rapid cleanups for sites heavily impacted by arrangers. This raises 
the specter of real environmental harm as Superfund sites are allowed to 
languish for years without cleanup. The impact that Superfund sites can 
have on human and environmental health is demonstrated by current sites 
that have not been properly cleaned up.176 A telling example of this is the 
decisions for various criteria including cost effectiveness and ensures that all decisions “meet cost-
based review criteria”). 
170 Superfund litigation was decreasing even before Burlington Northern. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-656, SUPERFUND: LITIGATION HAS DECREASED AND EPA NEEDS 
BETTER INFORMATION ON SITE CLEANUP AND COST ISSUES TO ESTIMATE FUTURE PROGRAM FUNDING 
REQUIREMENTS 7 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09656.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9SS-JRJU]. 
171 DAVID M. BEARDEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30798, ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS:
SUMMARIES OF MAJOR STATUTES ADMINISTERED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 58–
59 (2010).  
172 See EPA, FY 2016: EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 47–48 (2015), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-02/documents/fy_2016_bib_combined_v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB3X-U5CE]. 
173 This money is focused on emergency removal and response action. See id. 
174 See id. (“[T]he EPA will complete or oversee a total of 275 Superfund-lead and PRP-lead 
removal actions . . . .”). 
175 See id. at 48. 
176 As of November 29, 2016, there were 1337 sites listed on the National Priorities List. 
Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL), EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-national-
priorities-list-npl [https://perma.cc/HH6V-G2YQ] (last updated May 6, 2016). Languishing Superfund 
sites could also impede other redevelopment efforts as developers may not want to take on the burden 
of occupying and building on contaminated land. 
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Pearl Harbor Naval Complex in Hawaii, a site where PCBs, mercury, and 
volatile organic compounds have been found in the soil, and could 
eventually be released as harmful gases into the air.177 The hazardous waste 
sources found below the ground surface at Pearl Harbor also pose possible 
groundwater contamination issues in an area where about 110,000 people 
get their drinking water from wells.178 At the McCormick & Baxter 
Creosoting Company site in Stockton, California, a plant that treated utility 
posts and railroad ties with heavy metals, site-related toxins have been 
found in fish that are caught and consumed by the local population.179 The 
contaminants at the aforementioned sites have been linked to various health 
problems, including cancer, birth defects, and damage to the liver, the 
kidneys, and the central nervous system.180 These two sites are only a 
sampling of the many Superfund sites that have not been cleaned up across 
the country and continue to pose harm to human health and the 
environment.181 
In the current climate, where courts have not held many arrangers 
liable under CERCLA due to a more permissive approach to the useful 
product doctrine, sites impacted chiefly by arrangers may also be treated as 
177 Pearl Harbor Naval Complex, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/sfund/r9sfdocw.nsf/
ViewByEPAID/HI4170090076 [https://perma.cc/W7QL-Y4GL] (last updated Jan. 20, 2015); Kelly 
Zhou, Red, White, and Deadly: 8 of the Worst American Superfund Sites, TAKEPART (Feb. 22, 2013), 
http://www.takepart.com/photos/worst-superfund-sites/super-filthy [https://perma.cc/D63R-8K99]. 
178 Zhou, supra note 177. 
179 McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/sfund/r9sfdocw.nsf/
ViewByEPAID/cad009106527?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/5A5S-P3RP] (last updated Apr. 29, 
2015); Zhou, supra note 177.  
180 Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Toxicity: What Are Adverse Health Effects of PCB 
Exposure?, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY (May 14, 2014), https://www.atsdr. 
cdc.gov/csem/csem.asp?csem=30&po=10 [https://perma.cc/B2T3-SZ94]; Reproductive Health and the
Workplace, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/repro/heavymetals.html [https://perma.cc/EKM8-
APRR] (last updated Feb. 27, 2015); Volatile Organic Compounds’ Impact on Indoor Air Quality, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/indoor-air-quality-iaq/volatile-organic-compounds-impact-indoor-air-quality
[https://perma.cc/GYL6-RUUX] (last updated Sept. 7, 2016). 
181 The 38,000 people living near the Duwamish River Superfund site in the South Park, 
Georgetown, and Beacon Hill neighborhoods of Seattle suffer from higher rates of asthma, diabetes, 
and colorectal cancer than the rest of King County. Carol Smith, The High Health Costs of a Seattle’s 
Superfund Site: It Can Take Years Off Your Life, INVESTIGATEWEST (Mar. 20, 2011), http://invw.org/
2011/03/20/health-along-the-duwamish-a-superfund-runs-through-it/ [https://perma.cc/9MGC-WLFE]. 
There is also a higher infant mortality rate and lower life expectancy in these neighborhoods that has 
been linked in part to the proximity of the still contaminated site. Id. In Massachusetts, thirty-one sites 
pose an imminent health risk. Beverly Ford, The Bay State’s Toxic Legacy, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY 
(May 24, 2011, 3:20 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/05/24/4723/bay-states-toxic-legacy-0 
[https://perma.cc/GN76-3JCC]. At the New Bedford Harbor site, where seafood has been contaminated 
with PCBs, the EPA has classified the human exposure risk as “not under control.” Id. Residents near a 
site in Wilmington, Massachusetts are concerned that a cancer cluster is connected to toxins found in 
wells in 2002. Id. 
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a lower priority. In order to get cleaned up, Superfund sites must be 
evaluated by the National Remedy Review Board and be listed on the 
National Priorities List (NPL).182 Sites that are treated as lesser priorities 
may never be listed on the NPL or may simply languish there, stalled due 
to lack of funding.183 However, sites impacted by arrangements for disposal 
are not less harmful to environmental or human health.184 There are many 
current Superfund sites that could be impacted by this narrowed doctrine.185 
182 See Basic NPL Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/basic-npl-information 
[https://perma.cc/8WKG-7HQN] (last updated May 4, 2016); National Remedy Review Board (NRRB), 
supra note 169. A small subset of Superfund cleanups occur outside the NPL process. See Superfund 
Alternative Approach, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-alternative-approach 
[https://perma.cc/K6DK-GC5R] (last updated Mar. 10, 2016). 
183 See Juliet Eilperin, Lack of Funding Slows Cleanup of Hundreds of Superfund Sites, WASH.
POST (Nov. 25, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11246-2004Nov24.html 
[https://perma.cc/AF2R-G4H8]. 
184 Consider residential neighborhoods impacted by defunct lead smelters. Lead exposure can do 
significant damage to human health, even in small amounts, leading to a wide range of serious physical 
and developmental problems. See Ghost Factories, supra note 163. Children are particularly vulnerable. 
See id. While not linked to a defunct lead smelter, the 2016 public health crisis in Flint, Michigan, 
where corrosive water caused lead from pipes to leach into the drinking water supply, highlights the 
very serious dangers that lead contamination can pose to human and environmental health. See Julie 
Bosman et al., As Water Problems Grew, Officials Belittled Complaints from Flint, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/us/flint-michigan-lead-water-crisis.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/TM6W-6435]. Furthermore, Congress and the EPA are well aware of the dangers that 
arranger transactions can pose to both human and environmental health. The EPA warns of the hazards 
of these types of transactions: 
Hazardous secondary materials stored or transported prior to recycling have the potential to 
present the same types of threats to human health and the environment as hazardous wastes 
stored or transported prior to disposal. In fact, EPA has found that recycling operations have 
accounted for a number of significant damage incidents. . . . [H]azardous secondary materials 
destined for recycling were involved in one-third of the first 60 filings under RCRA’s imminent 
and substantial endangerment authority and in 20 of the initial 160 hazardous material sites 
listed for potential clean up under [CERCLA]. Congress also cited some damage cases which 
involve recycling . . . . Additional data . . . included in the rulemaking docket for today’s rule 
corroborate the fact that recycling operations can and have resulted in significant damage 
incidents. 
Definition of Solid Waste, 80 Fed. Reg. 1,694, 1,696 (Jan. 13, 2015) (internal citations omitted). 
185 Sites like the residential areas impacted by defunct lead smelters will be most seriously 
impacted by this narrowing of arranger liability. See Ghost Factories, supra note 163. The last lead 
smelter in the United States was closed in 2013, meaning that the majority of these entities are likely 
defunct and may not have parent companies to pursue in contribution actions. See Leah Thorsen, 
Smelter’s Closure Is End of an Era in Herculaneum, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 15, 2013), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/smelter-s-closure-is-end-of-an-era-in-herculaneum/article_
021e81bb-43f0-52ba-aadf-fe36681a0ad0.html [https://perma.cc/MD8H-BCWW]. The EPA cites 
thirteen Superfund cleanups across the country that were impacted by historic smelting and mining 
activities as just a few examples of sites where lead testing needed to be performed on people in the 
area. See Lead at Superfund Sites, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/lead-superfund-sites 
[https://perma.cc/XB4E-6C7H] (last updated June 14, 2016). If arrangers cannot be sought to help 
finance cleanups of these types because of the current state of the case law and the main actors (the lead 
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The recent court decisions will not only impact the ability of the agency to 
enforce against the arranging PRPs, but will also slow down cleanups and 
have a negative impact on human health and the environment.186 
Lower courts should scale back this move towards leniency while 
respecting Burlington Northern. The Court’s holding, while it did change 
the intent standard for arrangers, was so vague as to allow for different 
interpretations.187 Lower courts in the useful product arena have taken a 
broad view of the case, using it as a jumping-off point to promote the 
permissive, pro-defendant trend that has emerged in recent cases. Because 
of Burlington Northern’s flexibility, lower courts can revert back to some 
of the values of the pre-Burlington Northern world without disturbing 
Supreme Court precedent. They can do this in part by considering agency 
liability findings when making decisions about arranger liability, as 
discussed in the next Part. 
IV. AN INDICATIVE SHIFT?
Judicial deference to agencies is a complex and difficult area of the 
law and likely only tells part of the story in the useful product arena.188 
However, there is some evidence that the shift away from wide-reaching 
liability in the useful product context is symptomatic of a larger trend in 
administrative law. Since Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,189 the Court has attempted “to reassert the primacy 
smelters) are unable to pay, the cost of the cleanup will fall to the agency, which will stretch the EPA’s 
already strained Superfund budget and potentially stall the cleanup. 
186 Abandoned lead smelters illustrate the recent slowdown in cleanups. In April 2001, 
environmental scientist William Eckel compiled a list of 400 potential lead-smelting sites that had been 
abandoned and were unknown to regulators. See Alison Young, Long-Gone Lead Factories Leave 
Poisons in Nearby Yards, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/nation/story/2012-04-19/smelting-lead-contamination-government-failure/54399578/1 [https://
perma.cc/5FBJ-YV33]. A USA Today investigation found that regulators had done little to address the 
danger posed by these sites. Id. As of 2012, only eighteen sites had received any sort of cleanup. Id. 
Any cleanups of these sites may end up being funded by taxpayers, in part because many lead smelters 
are now defunct and the recent developments in arranger liability have left these sites with no private 
party to pay for cleanup. See Alison Young, Old Lead Factories May Stick Taxpayers with Cleanup 
Costs, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:43 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/
19/lead-smelter-cleanup-liabilities/1766747/ [https://perma.cc/W6WC-NSYJ]. 
187 MARK MISIOROWSKI & JOEL D. EAGLE, AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S BURLINGTON NORTHERN
DECISION 17 (2009), http://www.thompsonhine.com/uploads/1228/doc/DRI_Burlington_Northern.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L8TC-K5XT]. 
188 The deference inquiry in this space is complicated by the fact that while CERCLA cases often 
involve agency actions, they do not always involve them, such as when a private party seeks to recover 
cleanup costs. 
189 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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of the judiciary.”190 For example, in United States v. Mead Corp.,191 the 
Court expressly reduced the deference afforded to an agency when the 
interpretation at issue did not result from formal procedure.192 The Mead 
Court ultimately held that a tariff classification issued by the U.S. Customs 
Service did not carry the force of law and was not entitled to Chevron 
deference.193 The Mead analysis is a threshold inquiry to determine whether 
an agency action receives Chevron deference. If Congress did not delegate 
authority to an agency to “make rules carrying the force of law,” no 
Chevron deference should be afforded.194 Whether an agency action has the 
force of law is a complicated inquiry, but the Court emphasized that actions 
preceded by formal administrative processes such as formal adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking carry the force of law.195 Mead and other 
similar cases challenging agency action demonstrate decreased deference 
and increased judicial involvement in evaluating agency decisions.196 This 
represents a significant shift from the previous world order in which courts 
had given substantial deference to agency interpretations.197 
The shift in judicial application of the useful product doctrine 
correlates with this larger change from substantial deference to measured 
skepticism. The EPA finding of liability is an informal agency action that is 
not the result of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.198 
This agency finding serves as the basis of the government’s complaint 
against an arranger or is relied on by the PRP initiating a contribution 
190 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006). 
191 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
192 David Marshall Coover, III, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Why the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s New Section 111 Greenhouse Gas Regulations Do Not Fit in with Supreme Court Precedent 
or Congressional Intent in the Clean Air Act, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 7 (2015). 
193 533 U.S. at 226–27. The Court held: “[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory 
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Id. Instead, the Court found that the 
customs classifications at issue are “best treated like ‘interpretations contained in policy statements, 
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines’” and are therefore “beyond the Chevron pale.” Id. at 234 
(quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
194 Id. at 226–27. 
195 See id. at 229–30; Giacomo Gallai, Note, United States v. Mead Corp.: Will Administrative 
Transparency Survive the Increasing Demand for National Security?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 725, 728 
(2003). 
196 See Sunstein, supra note 190, at 190. 
197 The dissent in Christensen v. Harris County emphasized the Court’s departure from the 
Chevron standard. See 529 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because there is no reason to believe 
that the Department’s opinion was anything but thoroughly considered and consistently observed, it 
unquestionably merits our respect.”). 
198 See Superfund Unilateral Orders, supra note 29. 
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action as evidence of the arranger status of the PRP it is suing.199 While 
these liability determinations warrant no formal judicial deference,200 the 
pre-Burlington Northern cases demonstrate unofficial deference to agency 
findings consistent with a pre-Mead world,201 even if courts were not 
explicitly required to be deferential. The pre-Burlington Northern courts’ 
narrow application of the useful product doctrine and more or less 
consistent findings that selling hazardous secondary materials constituted 
arranging for disposal, reflected a general willingness to accept EPA 
liability determinations in arranger cases.202 In contrast, the cases post-
Burlington Northern are consistent with the decreased deference to agency 
determinations after Mead in that courts are engaging in a far more 
searching inquiry into intent, and more often than not, finding for the 
defendant arranger.203 
The increasing primacy of the judiciary204 is apparent in the useful 
product cases. Recent courts have engaged much more deeply with the 
useful product doctrine, considering circumstantial evidence ranging from 
the value of the material to how it was handled in determining the intent of 
the potential arranger.205 This more holistic inquiry indicates a decreased 
regard for the agency finding in support of defendant arranger liability. 
Admittedly, a change in attitude toward agency deference is not the only 
potential contributor to this shift. This shift could also be reflective of the 
judiciary’s larger distrust of CERCLA in that it seeks to regulate activity 
199 This is codified in a Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) issued under CERCLA § 106 that 
identifies liable parties and outlines facts supporting liability. See DON. R. CLAY, OFF. OF SOLID WASTE 
AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, OSWER DIRECTIVE NO. 9833.0-1a, GUIDANCE ON CERCLA SECTION 
106(a) UNILATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR REMEDIAL DESIGNS AND REMEDIAL ACTIONS 1, 7, 
12–13 (1990). In useful product cases, the UAO would contend that the party arranged for disposal by 
sending hazardous materials to a third party that ultimately contaminated the environment. If the PRP 
refuses to assist with the cleanup despite the threats of treble damages and penalties, the EPA refers the 
case to DOJ, which then files suit, alleging that the EPA issued a valid UAO and the party is liable. See 
id. at 3–5; Superfund Unilateral Orders, supra note 29. Alternatively, the EPA could undertake the 
cleanup and refer the cost recovery claim to the DOJ. See CLAY, supra, at 3–5. 
200 See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107–08 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Congress . . . designated the 
courts and not EPA as the adjudicator of the scope of CERCLA liability.”). 
201 See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 683–84 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380–82 (8th Cir. 1989).
202 See cases cited supra note 201.
203 See, e.g., United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 350–51 (8th Cir. 2015); Consolidation Coal
Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 155 (4th Cir. 2015); NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 
768 F.3d 682, 707 (7th Cir. 2014); Team Enters., LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901, 911 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
204 See Sunstein, supra note 190, at 190. 
205 See supra Section II.C. 
111:715 (2017) Going in CERCLAs 
749 
that a layperson would not find objectionable,206 or even as part of a larger 
backlash against the perceived unfairness of the statute.207 
The impact of Mead has already been documented in other 
environmental regulatory spaces. The Ninth Circuit in Hall v. EPA found 
that the EPA was not entitled to deference in its approval or denial of state 
revisions to air quality plans under the Clean Air Act.208 In Catskill 
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc., v. City of New York, the 
Second Circuit denied deference to the EPA position that the Clean Water 
Act discharge permit requirements do not apply to dams.209 Scholars have 
identified other possible areas where Mead could overturn agency action, 
including the National Standard Guidelines promulgated by the National 
Marine Fisheries Service210 and an Instruction Memorandum issued by the 
Bureau of Land Management.211 Courts in these areas have relied on Mead 
to deny Chevron deference to agency interpretations and have increased the 
primacy of the judiciary accordingly.  
Even if courts are not required to defer to agency findings of liability 
in the useful product arena,212 courts should return to allowing some 
deference in practice, as occurred in the pre-Burlington Northern world. 
The Mead Court found that even if an agency decision was not entitled to 
Chevron deference, courts could consider the factors introduced in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.213 in assessing how an agency’s action should be 
weighed.214 While no formal deference is due the EPA liability 
determinations under CERCLA, the Skidmore factors—care, consistency, 
formality, expertise, and persuasiveness—can still guide a court’s decision 
206 See Adam Babich, A New Era in Environmental Law, 20 COLO. LAW. 435, 444 (1991) (“EPA 
and the U.S. Justice Department clearly need reminding that a liability-based cleanup system will be 
acceptable to the public only if enforcement agencies learn to exercise a sense of fairness and a 
modicum of common sense.”). 
207 See James M. Sweeney, Opening the Front Door: The Argument for a Causal Requirement in 
Multisite CERCLA Litigation, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1989, 2009 (1999) (“The nearly impossible burden 
placed on defendants within this framework creates a perception of CERCLA’s liability scheme as 
inequitable among both litigants and the judiciary.”). 
208 273 F.3d 1146, 1154–56 (9th Cir. 2001).  
209 273 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2001). 
210 See Lindsay J. Nichols, Comment, The NMFS’s National Standard Guidelines: Why Judicial 
Deference May Be Inevitable, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1375, 1397–99 (2003). 
211 See Megan J. Anderson, The Energy Policy Act and Its Categorical Exclusions: What 
Happened to the Extraordinary Circumstance Exception?, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 119, 
129–31 (2008).  
212 See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107–08 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
213 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
214 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (“[C]ourts have looked to the degree of 
the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the 
agency’s position.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40). 
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under the useful product doctrine.215 In this context, courts should rely most 
heavily on the expertise of the agency in considering whether to defer to a 
defendant’s colorable claim or to consider the EPA’s finding of liability. 
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Mead, asserted that Skidmore deference to 
agency expertise is a “statement of the obvious: A judge should take into 
account the well-considered views of expert observers.”216 In the useful 
product context, liability determinations are technical, fact-specific, and 
complex.217 Because of this complexity, it is unlikely that judges can apply 
the useful product doctrine as proficiently or consistently as the EPA.218 For 
these reasons, the agency’s finding of liability should be carefully 
considered in courts’ decisionmaking process in useful product cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, communities along the Fox River are still grappling with how 
to deal with the legacy of the carbonless copy paper revolution. The river 
remains contaminated with PCBs. There has been a fish consumption 
advisory in place since 1976.219 Remediation efforts have been costly and 
time-consuming, and they are not yet finished.220 Because NCR was able to 
escape arranger liability due to courts’ new interpretation of the useful 
product doctrine, a source of funding for the cleanup has been eliminated. 
The responsibility for financing the remaining cleanup falls to a shrinking 
215 See id.  
216 Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
217 CERCLA is a notoriously complex statute that combines nuanced legal judgments with 
complex technical determinations. Practitioners have described aspects of the statute as “prohibitively 
complicated” and “difficult.” Allison B. Rumsey & Eric A. Rey, Untangling CERCLA Divisibility and 
the Fox River Litigation, ARNOLD & PORTER (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.apks.com/es/perspectives/
publications/2015/10/untangling-cercla-divisibility-and-the-ifox-rive__ [https://perma.cc/969T-NZKE]; 
Bruce Flushman, And You Thought CERCLA Was Complicated Before . . . Just Wait!!!, WENDEL 
ROSEN (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.wendel.com/knowledge-center/publications/2009/and-you-thought-
cercla-was-complicated-before-just-wait- [https://perma.cc/3KKF-NBW4].  
218 During internal deliberations over Chevron, Justice Stevens acknowledged both the complexity 
of environmental law as well as the expertise of the agency in making decisions when he said, “When I 
am so confused, I go with the agency.” Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an 
Accidental Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 272 (2014). 
219 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE
REGISTRY, PCB CONTAMINATED SEDIMENT IN THE LOWER FOX RIVER AND GREEN BAY 
NORTHEASTERN WISCONSIN 7 (2006), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/pha/FoxRiver/PCBinFoxRiver_
GreenBayPHA031406.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CEV-5P38]; WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., FISH 
CONSUMPTION ADVICE FOR GREEN BAY AND THE LOWER FOX RIVER AREA OF CONCERN (2012), 
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/fishing/documents/GreenBayFoxRiver2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PJQ-9ZH8]. 
220 The cleanup began in 2001, when the EPA and Wisconsin proposed a joint cleanup plan, which 
is currently scheduled to be completed by 2017. See Lower Fox River, supra note 3. The cleanup is 
estimated to cost $1 billion. See Srubas, supra note 5. 
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number of PRPs and may ultimately shift the burden of funding the cleanup 
from the private sector to the public purse. 
Although minor in terms of its lasting technological impact, as we 
approach the sixty-third anniversary of the invention of carbonless copy 
paper, the environmental damage of this novelty is not inconsequential. If 
success is measured by the number of sites cleaned up and the speed with 
which such sites are addressed, then the “polluters must pay” sentiment in 
CERCLA legislative history, the plain language of the statute itself, and the 
expert findings of the EPA should guide judicial decisionmaking. To 
rectify the damage that has already been done to the Fox River and to 
rectify similar damage that has been wrought by arrangers across the 
country, it is critical that courts begin to curb this trend of permissive 
arranger liability by walking back the lower court’s expansion of 
Burlington Northern’s already permissive rule and carefully considering 
agency liability determinations. In doing so, they will return to CERCLA’s 
statutory roots and facilitate cleanups by forcing the polluters responsible 
to bear the costs of the cleanup. 
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